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Abstract—Achieving secure communication between an
Implantable Medical Device (IMD) inside the body and a
gateway outside the body has showed its criticality with
recent reports of hackings such as in St. Jude Medical’s
Implantable Cardiac Devices, Johnson and Johnson insulin
pumps and vulnerabilities in brain Neuro-implants. The
use of asymmetric cryptography in particular is not a
practical solution for IMDs due to the scarce computa-
tional and power resources, symmetric key cryptography
is preferred. One of the factors in security of a symmetric
cryptographic system is to use a strong key for encryption.
A solution to develop such a strong key without using
extensive resources in an IMD, is to extract it from the
body physiological signals. In order to have a strong
enough key, the physiological signal must be a strong
source of randomness and InterPulse Interval (IPI) has
been advised to be such that. A strong randomness
source should have five conditions: Universality (available
on all people), Liveness (available at any-time), Robust-
ness (strong random number), Permanence (independent
from its history) and Uniqueness (independent from other
sources). Nevertheless, for current proposed random ex-
traction methods from IPI these conditions (mainly last
three conditions) were not examined. In this study, firstly,
we proposed a methodology to measure the last three
conditions: Information secrecy measures for Robustness,
Santha-Vazirani Source delta value for Permanence and
random sources dependency analysis for Uniqueness. Then,
using a huge dataset of IPI values (almost 900,000,000
IPIs), we showed that IPI does not have conditions of
Robustness and Permanence as a randomness source. Thus,
extraction of a strong uniform random number from IPI
value, mathematically, is impossible. Thirdly, rather than
using the value of IPI, we proposed the trend of IPI as a
source for a new randomness extraction method named as
Martingale Randomness Extraction from IPI (MRE-IPI).
We evaluated MRE-IPI and showed that it satisfies the
Robustness condition completely and Permanence to some
level. Finally, we used NIST STS and Dieharder test suites
and showed that MRE-IPI is able to outperform all recent
randomness extraction methods from IPIs and its quality
is half of the AES random number. MRE-IPI, still, is not
a strong random number and could not be used as the
secret key for a secure communication, however, it can be
used as a one-time pad in exchanging the secret key for
a communication. In this case, the usage of MRE-IPI will
be kept at a minimum level and reduces the probability
of breaking it. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work in this area which uses such a comprehensive
method and large dataset to examine the randomness of
a physiological signal.
I. INTRODUCTION
Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) provide a new
perspective to healthcare system. Based on real-time
date received from an IMD, the doctor could update
the its settings using a gateway outside of the body
of patient. This is a huge benefit for the patients as it
helps the doctors for early detection of complications,
early identification of the patients with high health risks
and early recognition of suboptimal IMD functions [1].
Moreover, with IMDs, the healthcare without affecting
the patient’s life becomes feasible (e.g. Diabetics and
Dementia patients [2]). It also has been shown that
remote monitoring of the patients using IMDs is very
cost effective for the healthcare system as well [3].
There are three classes of Implants: Fashion Trend,
Life Enhancing and Life Preserving [2]. The first cate-
gory belongs to the implants which designed to make
the life more comfortable such as pet chips [4] and
key implants for unlocking doors or computers [5]. This
category is usually based on RFID devices. Life enhanc-
ing implants are such as cochlear or dental implants.
This category of implants is mostly without battery,
though a new generation of life enhancing implants are
equipped with battery and sensors to collect information
from the body and send it outside (e.g. collecting PH
level and pressure in a knee [6]). The third category
is life preserving implants. In this category, implants
are mostly equipped with battery and in new genera-
tion of these devices, they are actively communicating
with outside world and exchange information with their
gateway device. The focus of this paper is on the life
preserving IMDs which have sensing, computation and
communication capability.
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2Once an IMD is able to communicate by sending
sensed data and receive operational commands, the se-
curity of the device becomes the main concern. The
security of IMDs is one of the emerging research ar-
eas and many studies have highlighted its criticality in
today’s world. For instance, [7] showed how an attack
to a brain’s IMD could take control of the implant
and do some alteration on the victim’s emotion. In
another example, Reuters reported vulnerabilities in in-
sulin pumps created by Johnson & Johnson manufacturer
[8], where attacker is able to intercept the commutation
and/or request for a wrong dosage of insulin. More
recently, Guardian [9] reported that more than half a
million people are in danger because of the vulnera-
bilities found in St. Jude pacemakers. The challenge
in secure communication between an IMD inside the
body and a gateway outside the body is that the usage
of asymmetric cryptography is not preferred [10], [11].
This is due to the resource hungry nature of public key
cryptography, while IMDs are highly restricted in size
[12], material [13], energy usage [14] and computation
and communication power [15]. Thus, many studies
proposed symmetric encryption as a low resource hungry
crypto-system for IMDs.
Based on the report published by WhiteScope [16],
more than 8000 vulnerabilities have been found in ex-
amining only seven models of peacemakers. The main
reasons for this high number of vulnerabilities were,
firstly, not using encryption method at all or secondly,
using static (permanent) keys in encryption. To use tem-
porary keys as a solution for this problem, IMD should
be able to generate a strong cryptographic key each time
the secure communication is needed. A great solution
is proposed by [17] where in this method, IMD and
the gateway measure a body physiological signal at the
same time and create a secret key from it. Then, without
any key exchanging process, they are sharing the same
secret key. This method is called Physiological Value-
Based (PVS) security solutions [18]. In this scheme,
the security of the crypto-system highly depends on the
randomness of physiological signal which is used to
create a strong secret key.
Several physiological signals have been proposed in
the literatures to be used as the source of randomness for
generating secret key such as Brain waves or electroen-
cephalograms (EEG) [19], electrocardiogram (EKG) [20]
and Photoplethysmogram (PPG) [21], Electrocardiogra-
phy (ECG) [22] and InterPulse Intervals (IPI) [17]. IPI is
the time difference between two peaks of an ECG signal.
As shown in Fig. 1, there are three peaks for every heart
beat in the ECG signal named as Q, R and S. So, three
IPI values could be extracted from the time difference
Fig. 1: QRS peaks of Heartbeat (Source [23])
between each two corresponding peaks (Q-Q, R-R, S-S).
Among these, R has the highest peak and the easiest one
to detect. In the rest of this paper, whenever we refer to
IPI, it is the R-R time difference.
The contributions of this paper are, firstly, proposing a
comprehensive methodology to examine the randomness
of physiological signals. Although the focus of this
paper is only on IPI, the methodology could be used
on other signals as well. Secondly, using a large dataset
with almost 900,000,000 IPI records, we showed that
despite current claims, IPI is not a strong source of
randomness. Thirdly, we developed a new randomness
extraction method using Martingale Stochastic Process
which is much stronger compared to other proposed
methods in literature. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work in this area which, introduces and
uses a comprehensive evaluation method to examine the
randomness strength of a physiological signal.
This paper is organized as follows: in the next section,
we discuss assumptions and requirements for the PVS
method. Next, we present current randomness extraction
methods from IPI. After that, we evaluate the random-
ness of IPI using a comprehensive methodology. Then,
we present our proposed randomness extraction method
followed by evaluating its strength compared to current
methods. In final section, we conclude the paper by
summing up the findings.
II. REQUIREMENTS
In PVS methodology, the gateway outside of the
body initiates a request for communication to the IMD.
Then, both devices start to measure a physiological
signal. There are several assumptions here. Firstly, the
physiological signal should be measurable from inside
and outside the body. However, to preserve the privacy
and security of IMD, the physiological signal should not
be measurable with a distance to the body. This is based
on the idea that if a gateway gets very close to the body,
3preferably touching the skin for a specific duration of
time, it means that the gateway can be trusted. So, the
physiological signal should be measurable from outside
of the body but not from a distance.
The second assumption in PVS methodology is that,
measuring the PVS signal for implant does not consume
considerable amount of energy. Since, the IMDs are very
limited in every aspect of computing including energy,
measuring physiological signal by them should be prac-
tically feasible. The third assumption is synchronization
between the gateway and the IMD. In order to produce
same secret key on both sides, IMD and gateway should
start measuring the physiological signal at the same time.
Based on the type of physiological signal a soft or hard
synchronization is needed. Again, due to the limitations
in IMDs, soft synchronization is more feasible as it
needs less resources compared to a hard synchronization.
After generating the secret key in both devices, if it
is strong enough, it can be used as the session key.
Otherwise, it can be used to setup a strong session key
through the gateway. Among physiological signals, IPI
can be easily measured inside and outside of the body.
Touching the body would be enough for IPI and it does
not need extra equipment for collecting signals (e.g. EEG
signal). IPI can be collected with soft synchronization,
since after handshaking, both devices need to wait for
the first heartbeat R-peak to start the measurement. The
question remains is that how strong will be the secret
key generated from IPI.
A physiological signal must be a good source of
randomness for generating strong secret key by satis-
fying five conditions [24]. The first condition is the
Universality referring to the availability of the signal on
all people. The second condition is Liveness where the
physiological is always available for measurement any
time anywhere. Thirdly, the extraction of a new secret
key should be always possible from the physiological
signal (Permanence). For instance, if the secret key s1
is generated from a physiological signal at the time t1,
sn generated at time tn should not be guessable based
on {s1, s2, ..., sn−1}. If a physiological signal does not
have the feature of Permanence, it can only be used
once or very occasionally, because repetitive usage of it
provides enough information for an adversary to guess
it. The next condition is Uniqueness. It means that the
physiological signal on two different subjects should be
accounted as two independent sources of randomness.
Considering the availability of physiological signals for
the subject i (pi = {si,1, si,2, ..., si,n}), sj,n which is
physiological signal at time n for subject j, should not be
guessable based on pi. Robustness is the last condition
which shows that computationally guessing the secret
key should not be feasible whether or not the adversary
has some information about the physiological signal.
Robustness of a source is calculated by information
secrecy measures. Information secrecy measures exam-
ine the strength of the secret key against an adversary
who tries to guess the key. Based on the knowledge of the
adversary from the secret key, three scenarios could hap-
pen. In the best-case scenario, adversary does not have
any information about the secret key and wants to blindly
guess it. This situation is called Perfect Secrecy. In the
second scenario which is called Conditional Secrecy,
adversary has some information correlated with the key.
Unconditional Secrecy is the worst-case scenario where
adversary knows the distribution histogram of the secret
keys. This helps adversary to find which values could be
the best guess for determining the secret key. For each
scenario, there is a method to measure the strength of
the secret key. In addition to these three, Probabilistic
Bound is the forth information secrecy measure which
shows the distance between the secret key distribution
and a uniform distribution [25].
Among these physiological signals, IPI has some
unique properties which makes it one of the most cited
methods in the literature to be used as the source
of randomness in generating the secret key. Firstly, it
has the condition of Universality as everyone has the
heartbeat signal. There are two exceptions here. First one
is the flat line heart pulse in emergency situation and the
second one is the controlled heartbeat by a peacemaker.
Both of these situations are excluded from the scope of
this article. The second property of IPI which makes it
a good source of randomness for generating the secret
key is that, it has the Liveness condition as well, where
the heartbeat signal is always available to measure for
everyone (excluding two situations which mentioned
above). Thirdly, detection of IPI does not need complex
hardware or software analysis and is very simple to be
implemented in an IMD. Lastly, it can be measured in
almost every location inside the body and outside by
touching the skin. The only question remains is if the IPI
is a strong source of randomness for generating secret
key to be used in a crypto-system. Although it has been
claimed in many studies that IPI is a strong randomness
source, its Permanence, Uniqueness and Robustness have
not been examined.
III. RELATED WORK
Using IPI as a source of randomness has been pro-
posed by [17], where a random extraction algorithm
is needed to convert IPI value to a random number.
A few randomness extractor algorithms from IPI have
been proposed in the literature. Proposed methods are
4including using XOR function [26], gray-coding [27] and
using frequency domain [28], [24], [29]. In some studies,
a combination of algorithms is used for randomness
extraction. For instance, [30], [31], [32] used accumula-
tion, modulo, contract mapping and gray-coding for the
extractor and [33] proposed a combination of concate-
nation, quantization and gray-coding as the randomness
extractor from IPI.
Whatever the extraction method is, it needs to be eval-
uated for the quality of generated randomness. Several
extracting methods did not perform any randomness test
to examine the quality of proposed algorithm (e.g. [34],
[35], [28], [24], [36], [37], [29]). In these works the
aim of the paper was not examining the randomness of
proposed extraction method. There are other randomness
extraction works in which there was an attempt to
measure the quality of proposed method. However, in
these works, two aspects have been somewhat ignored.
To evaluate the quality of a randomness extractor, the
dataset and the methodology of evaluation are the key
points. For instance, [27] evaluated the randomness
property of their algorithm with 5 minutes ECG data
of 10 subject by NIST Statistical Test Suite (STS) [38]
randomness test. [30], [31], [32] tested their algorithm
using 5 minutes ECG signal of 40 subjects with NIST
STS. In another work, [22] used histogram analysis on
1500 consecutive IPI values. [39] tested their proposed
method with 100 subjects’ ECG data with Entropy test.
[33], to evaluate the randomness of proposed algorithm,
used Temporal Ratio [40] method over 5 minutes ECG
data of 50 subjects.
Current evaluation methods for examining the ran-
domness of IPI are limited to using a few randomness
tests functions against a very small dataset of IPI values.
In order to have a complete evaluation of the strength
of a randomness source, first of all, conditions such as
Permanence, Uniqueness and Robustness (including Per-
fect Secrecy, Conditional Secrecy, Unconditional Secrecy
and Probabilistic Bound) of the random source must be
examined. Secondly, a large data set of IPIs is needed for
evaluation of aforementioned measures. In all previous
works, the maximum number of subjects to examined
were 100 and the largest number of IPI reading from
one subject was 1500 consecutive values. This is far
below the number of IPI values which are needed to
examine the strength of randomness. For instance, to
measure the Unconditional Secrecy in Robustness con-
dition (Min-Entropy of a string with size 16 which will
be discussed later), considering the best-case scenario
where the distribution of the source is uniform, at least
1000 ∗ 216 = 65, 536, 000 samples of IPIs are needed to
provide a confidence interval of 95% in the result. None
Fig. 2: Histogram analysis of IPIs
of the current randomness extraction methods from IPI
used such methods and large datasets to evaluate their
algorithms. In contrast to previous works, we gathered
a large dataset of IPI values. Moreover, we proposed
methods for measuring all the conditions to examine the
strength of the IPI as a randomness source. In addition
to that, we developed a randomness extraction algorithm
and compared its strength against these conditions and
reported it.
IV. IPI RANDOMNESS
A. Dataset
In this work, using PhysioNet [41], we have created
a dataset of IPIs containing 4338 subjects and a total
of 895,621,566 IPI values. This dataset comprises of a
wide range of subjects including healthy subjects resting,
healthy subject during Cardio test, subjects with heart
problem and failure, infants, children, young, middle age
and senior subjects both male and female. We did not
restrict the dataset selection from PhysioNet’s datasets
and the aim was to collect as much as possible IPI data.
Whenever possible, the IPI signal is get from audited
signal files (ATR files), or from non-audited annotation
files (QRS, WQRS, ECG and XYZ files), otherwise
using QRS procedure of PhysioNet in Matlab, IPIs are
extracted from DAT files.
We have extracted the IPI distribution histogram from
the harvested dataset is presented in Fig. 2. The mini-
mum value of IPI in this histogram is 20 which is equiv-
alent to 300bpm = 60/0.20 (heartbeat per minute) and
the maximum is 330, equivalent to 18bpm = 60/3.30.
To convert an IPI value to a binary representation, an
8-bit string is used for conversion of ipi = IPI − 20. We
subtracted IPI from 20, so ipi starts from 0. Thus, the
5ipi value will be from 0 to 310 which to present it in
binary, 9 bits are needed. However, as it is shown later,
the most significant bit in ipi does not provide much
randomness and has been removed. So, we used an 8-bit
representation of ipi value in following sections.
B. String Size
To apply the measures of Permanency, Uniqueness
and Robustness, we need to consider the string size
of concatenated measures. Considering a series of IPI
values, we define the string of Zk = [ipi1 · ipi2 · ... · ipin]
as the concatenation of ipij = {0, 1}k where k is the
number of bits from each ipi value (0 < k ≤ 8). For
example, consider a series of IPI values as 160, 125,
132, 171, 148 and 130, then deducting 20 will give
us ipi = {140, 105, 112, 151, 128, 110} and using only
the two least significant bits of each ipi (k = 2) and
concatenating them, we have Z2 = [000100110010].
In order to examine the randomness of Z2, all the
measurement methods need the distribution of bits in Z2.
If we look at s = {0, 1}1 for Z2, we have DZ2,1 = {8, 4},
which means 8 zeros and 4 ones. For distribution of the
string s = {0, 1}2 = {00, 01, 10, 11}, there are four combi-
nations to look at. To calculate DZ2,1, Z2 is parsed twice.
In the first parse, we have aZ2,1 = {00, 01, 00, 11, 00, 10}.
In order to make sure that all possible patterns of bits
in Z2 have been observed, we use circulation method
which has been used in several randomness test suites
(e.g. [42], [43]) for creating the distribution histogram.
Thus, we go to the second parse and rather than starting
from the first bit in Z2, we start from the second bit
and then we have aZ2,2 = {00, 10, 01, 10, 01, 00}. For
the last bit in Z2, we concatenate it with the first bit
of Z2 to have 00 at the end of aZ2,2. Now, looking
at both aZ2,1 and aZ2,2, we have DZ2,2 = {5, 3, 3, 1}.
With the same process, when s = {0, 1}3, three parses
on Z2 will be done and the distribution of Z2 will be
DZ2,3 = {2, 3, 2, 1, 3, 0, 1, 0}. In theory, to calculate the
distribution for string s = {0, 1}n, n must be 1 ≤ n < ∞,
however, in practice the maximum size of n is associated
with the size of dataset. As discussed in the first section,
the maximum value for n in this article is 16.
C. Robustness
IPI as a source of randomness has the robustness prop-
erty if knowing its probabilistic distribution (partially or
fully) would not help in predicting its next value. Based
on the information secrecy measures [25], we measure
Perfect Secrecy by Shannon Entropy (Eq. 1) [44] which
quantifies the encoded length of the source. In this mode,
adversary has no knowledge from the distribution of the
source. We measure Conditional Secrecy using Renyi
Entropy or its descendant Collision Entropy (Eq. 2) [45]
which bounds the collision probability between samples.
The second measure of Conditional Secrecy is Guessing
Entropy (Eq. 3) [46] which shows the difficulty of
guessing the value of a random variable. Unconditional
Secrecy quantifies unpredictability of the source and we
measure it using Min-Entropy (Eq. 4)[47]. Indeed, in Un-
conditional Secrecy, adversary has complete knowledge
of the distribution histogram of the random source. So,
it knows which output from the random source has the
highest probability to occur. The last information secrecy
measure is Probabilistic Bounds which calculates the
distance between distributions of the random source
and uniform distribution over the same range (Eq. 5).
Considering X ∈ {0, 1}n, a randomness extractor works
as Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k such that Ext(X) is distributed
in {0, 1}k , then the entropies of a random variable X is
defined as:
HSh(X) = −
∑
x∈R(X)
Pr[X = x].log(Pr[X = x]) (1)
Hα=2(X) ≡ 11 − α
∑
x∈R(X)
Pr[X = x]α (2)
G(X) =
∑
x∈R(X)
Pr[X = x](x + 1) (3)
H∞(X) = min
x∈R(X)
{
log
1
Pr[X = x]
}
(4)
| |Px − Py | |1 =
∑
x∈R(X)
|Px[X = x] − Py[X = x]| (5)
Many researchers used all the 8 bits of an IPI (e.g.
[34]) as the source of randomness, however, there are
some works only considering a subset of it. For instance,
[35], [36] used the first 4 bits of an IPI and [39] used
the first 2 bits of the IPI. To identify which combination
of bits of an IPI is the best source for randomness,
in all measurements, we examined 8 scenarios which
in the first scenario only one bit (the least significant
bit) is the source of randomness. Using respectively
for all scenarios, in scenario n (n ∈ {1..8}), the first
n least significant bits of IPI is used as the source
of randomness. Corresponding to these 8 scenarios, we
created 8 datasets from the main ipi database. The first
dataset contains the first least significant bit of an IPI.
Dataset No. 2 contains the two least significant bits of
an IPI and so on and so forth till Dataset No. 8 which
contains all the 8 bits of an IPI value.
The result of Shannon Entropy analysis of IPI is
presented in Fig. 3. As shown, the dataset which contains
the two least significant bits of IPI (Dataset 2) has the
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Fig. 3: Shannon Entropy of selected bits of IPI in various
string lengths
highest Shannon Entropy value. It is also clear that even
by increasing the length of string in Entropy calculation,
the Shannon Entropy of dataset 2 is still close to one.
The worst Entropy belongs to dataset 8 where all 8 bits
of IPI is being used.
Since dataset 2 has the Shannon Entropy of almost 1,
in the condition of Perfect Secrecy where adversary has
zero knowledge about the random source distribution,
it has almost perfect random quality. The next step is
to measure the entropy when the adversary has partial
information about the random source (Conditional Se-
crecy).
Fig. 4 shows Collision Entropy results which is almost
similar to Shannon Entropy with a small decrease. Once
again, dataset 2 has the highest entropy value and up
to the string length of 16 is still over 0.95. Collision
Entropy shows the diversity of string patterns in the
dataset and for this, dataset 2 shows a very high diversity.
Collision Entropy or in general Renyi Entropy is a
measure for Conditional Secrecy where adversary knows
a value which has some correlation with the random
value. In this situation, also, dataset 2 shows an almost
perfect form of randomness.
The second measure of Conditional Secrecy is Guess-
ing Entropy (Fig. 5), the value of entropy is subtracted
from 0.5. The reason is that guessing entropy shows
the difficulty of guessing the random value and the
entropy rate of guessing entropy is the probability of
guessing the right value for a bit. So, the value 0.5
for guessing entropy rate shows that the adversary is
not able to have a good guess about the bit and the
chance to be correct is 50%. Thus, we used the 0.5 as
the benchmark line and deduct the guessing entropy rate
from it and now a value of zero in the curve means
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Fig. 5: Guessing Entropy of selected bits of IPI in various
string lengths
that the probability of guessing the next bit is 0.5. By
increasing this value, the probability of guessing the next
bit is increasing. As shown, for all datasets, Guessing
Entropy (subtracted from 0.5) is very close to zero which
means the probability of guessing the next output from
the source is 0.5. In this test, closest values to 0 are for
datasets 2,3,4 and 5.
Min-Entropy is the measure of Unconditional Secrecy,
where the adversary knows the distribution histogram of
the random source. Min-Entropy result (Fig. 6) shows
that IPI is not performing well in almost all datasets.
As shown, the value of entropy rate drops to lower
than 0.8 by increasing the string size to 16 in all
datasets. However, dataset 2 still has the highest Entropy
value compared to others. Min-Entropy is a measure of
predictiveness of the string where values close to one
indicate unpredictability of the source and for IPI it
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Fig. 7: Uniformity Check for selected bits of IPI in
various string lengths
demonstrates that the source is not highly unpredictable.
Last step in analysing the Robustness of randomness
source is measuring the Probabilistic Bound. In this pro-
cess, we calculate the distance between random variable
and a uniform distribution using Eq. 5. The closer value
to zero shows smaller distance to a uniform distribution
which means better value for Probabilistic Bound. As
shown in Fig. 7, the closest dataset of IPIs to uniform
distribution belongs to dataset 1, 2. Especially, in dataset
1, in all string lengths the cumulative distance to a
uniform distribution is less than 0.1.
The Robustness analysis of IPI using the information
secrecy measures reveals two points. Firstly, if the ad-
versary has no knowledge or limited knowledge about
the distribution of IPI, IPI can be used as a very robust
source of randomness. However, it seems reasonable to
consider that the histogram of IPI distribution is not hard
to collect (see Fig. 2). If the adversary has the knowledge
about the IPI distribution histogram, then IPI is not
a very robust source of randomness despite the claim
made by many researchers lately. The second point from
Robustness analysis is that the dataset 2 which contains
the two least significant bits of IPI values, is a more
robust randomness source compared to other datasets.
D. Permanence
IPI as a randomness source has Permanence condition
if knowing the history of the heartbeat of one person
would not help in predicting his/her future heartbeats.
To measure the Permanence, we propose using Santha-
Vazirani method. A randomness source is called Santha-
Vazirani source (SV-source) [48] where the outcome of
last generated bit is related to the previous outcomes.
For source X and δ ∈ [0, 1], we have:
∀i ∈ n, ∀xi ∈ {0, 1} → 1 − δ2 ≤ Pr[Xi = xi |∀xi−1] ≤
1 + δ
2
(6)
δ is the bias for the new bit xi, which it has some
dependencies to the previous bits in the source {0, 1}i−1.
In a simpler form we have:
∀x, y ∈ {0, 1}n → Pr[X = x]
Pr[Y = y] ≤
1 + δ
1 − δ (7)
The best possible δ value is zero for any string
length which demonstrates that the source is not Santha-
Vazirani. If δ is equal to zero, the probability of having
zero or one is always 0.5, no matter how much data
is available. To evaluate the predictiveness of source X
from Eq. 7, we calculated the maximum and minimum of
Pr[X = x] for ∀x ∈ {0, 1}n where n = 1..16 using the 8
datasets of IPI values. Then, using Eq. 7, we calculated
the δ value of SV-source and results are presented in
Fig. 8.
As shown in Fig. 8, IPI is a SV-source as there is a
great dependency for the new outcome of the source to
its history. Once again, dataset 2 has the lowest δ value
compared to other datasets. However, for all the datasets,
when the string length is more than 10, δ is almost
equal to one. That means that with enough history, the
adversary is able to predict the next random value with
the probability very close to 1.
It has been mathematically proven that the extraction
of a uniform random bit from a SV-source is impossible
[48]. By this, we conclude that the IPI value has not the
condition of Permanence as a source of randomness to
be used in a crypto-system.
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Fig. 8: δ value of SV-source for various string lengths
of IPIs
E. Uniqueness
IPI as a randomness source has the Uniqueness condi-
tion if having the heartbeat of someone would not help
in predicting the heartbeat of another person. For short,
the random sources should be independent from each
other. To measure the dependency of different subjects
IPI values from each other, we propose to use the
dependency analysis of random sources presented by
[49]. As shown in Eq. 9, the summation of entropies
of two randomness sources are bigger or equal to the
entropy value of their combination as one source. In
Eq. 9 two sources are independent from each other only
and if only limeindp →∞.
H(X,Y ) ≤ H(X) + Y (Y ) (8)
H(X) = −
∑
t
px(t) log px(t)
H(Y ) = −
∑
t
py(s) log py(s)
H(X,Y ) =
∑
t,s
px,y(t, s) log px,y(t, s)
eindp = H(X) + H(Y ) − H(X,Y ) (9)
To examine the independence of IPI values of differ-
entness sources to each other, we selected 1360 sub-
jects from the IPI dataset. These subjects have more
than 100,000 consecutive IPI values because dependency
analysis between random sources needs a large sample
size. From this pool of 1360 subjects, for 10,000 times,
we selected two random subject and calculate the eindp.
The box plot of eindp values is presented in Fig. 9. As
shown, datasets of 1, 2 and 3 are showing the condition
of Uniqueness completely. For dataset 4, the average
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Fig. 9: Dependency analysis among IPIs from different
subjects
value of eindp is almost zero, despite a few outliers.
For other datasets, the dependency between two random
sources is shown with high average values and outliers.
In conclusion, despite the claim has been made by
previous works, the value of IPI is not a good source
of randomness. It provides Robustness to some level,
but considering the worth case scenario (Unconditional
Secrecy), it fails to provide Robustness. Moreover, IPI
could not satisfy the Permanence condition as it is
highly dependent to its history. Finally, IPI provides the
Uniqueness as a random source which shows every heart
could be considered as an independent source compared
to others. Among the 8 datasets used in this experiment,
dataset 2 has better results, which shows the two least
significant bits of IPI are the better source of randomness
compared to other combination of bits. However, due
to the fact discussed, even the two least significant bits
of IPI is not a strong random number and thus not
appropriate to be used in a crypto-system.
V. MARTINGALE RANDOMNESS EXTRACTION FOR
IPI (MRE-IPI)
Rather than using the IPI values, which as we have
shown above are not a good source of randomness,
we propose to use the trend in which IPI is changing.
Intuitively, whilst the value of IPI is affected by its pre-
vious values, the trend and rate of change are influenced
by both physiological and contextual factors, activities,
emotions and etc. Martingale Stochastic Process [50] has
been used in many applications of randomness such as
extraction [51], developing computable randomness [52],
algorithmic randomness theory [53] or even stock market
9analysis [54]. However, it has not been used to extract
the randomness from IPI trend.
Martingale is a sequence of random variable where
the expectation of the next value is equal to the previous
value. There are two main properties for Martingale as
follows:
∀n,E(|Xn |) < ∞ (10)
∀n,E(Xn+1) = Xn (11)
As shown in Eq 11, in Martingale Stochastic Process
the expectation of next value is equal to the previous
value. In order to use Martingale on IPI, we must convert
it to the Martingale Stochastic Process. Then, we use this
Martingale and extract the random variable from it. We
called this algorithm as Martingale Randomness Extrac-
tion for IPI (MRE-IPI). To develop stochastic process,
extract the randomness and test it, we used dataset 2 from
previous section which contains the least two significant
bits of IPI. From now on, for simplicity we refer to
dataset 2 as only the dataset. Moreover, to answer that
MRE-IPI is not biased on the IPI values in the dataset,
the dataset is divided to two subsets randomly, one
for randomness extraction analysis (training dataset) and
another one for evaluating the proposed method (testing
dataset). The train dataset consists of 2212 subjects with
the total of 457,491,012 IPI values and the test dataset
consists of 2126 subjects with the total of 438,130,554
IPI values.
The first step in MRE-IPI is to develop a conversion
function F : {0, 1}t → {0, 1} which can satisfy Eq. 11.
In this situation, we prefer to use the minimum possible
value for t. Using of large values for t, increases the
number of IPI values needed to generate one random
bit. For example, if t = 20, using 2 bits of an IPI, we
need 10 IPI values to generate one bit in Martingale
Stochastic Process. Based on our analysis the optimum
value for t is equal to 3. To do this, we calculated the
probability distribution for all possible combinations of
3 bits for train dataset as presented in Table I.
The best combination of strings which could provide
the commutative probability of occurrence of 0.5 is as
follow:
• Group 1: G1 = {000, 011, 101, 110}, where P(X =
G1) = 0.499777776
• Group 2: G2 = {001, 010, 100, 111}, where P(X =
G2) = 0.500222224
Consider Xn = x as a random variable and Xn+1 as the
next random variable in a time series, then X ← F (s)
is defined as:
TABLE I: Probabilistic distribution of all possible com-
bination of bits for string length of 3
No. String Probability of occurrence
0 000 0.133567088
1 001 0.122682815
2 010 0.130448785
3 011 0.119522821
4 100 0.122658224
5 101 0.127181921
6 110 0.119505945
7 111 0.1244324
Xn+1 =
{
Xn + 1 s ∈ G1
Xn − 1 s ∈ G2
(12)
where s ∈ S = {0, 1}3, and S is the random variable of
IPI from training dataset 2. Then E E(Xn+1) = G1 ∗ (x +
1) + G2 ∗ (x − 1). As G1,G2 ≈ 0.5, then E(Xn+1) = x,
which is the value for Sn. Thus, E(Xn+1) = Xn and Eq. 12
is a Martingale Stochastic Process (Eq. 11).
The second phase is to use X ← F (s) with two
threshold values to produce the random bit. Consider
t1 > 0 and t2 < 0 as two threshold points, then we have:
∀n, Xn ← F (s) (13)
Xn > t1 → Xn = 0,R(s) = 1 (14)
Xn < t2 → Xn = 0,R(s) = 0 (15)
where R(s) is the output of random variable R from
the proposed method MRE-IPI. Higher threshold levels
will increase the number of bits we need from IPI
to generate one MRE-IPI random bit. However, lower
t values may not provide a good randomness quality.
Based on the experiments that we have done, the best
value for threshold level is t1 = t2 = 3.
VI. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In order to examine the randomness of MRE-IPI
algorithm we used two approaches. In the first step, we
conducted an entropy analysis on the result of MRE-IPI
to examine the Robustness and Permanence of MRE-
IPI. We did not test the condition of Uniqueness, since
in previous section, we showed that the dataset (number
2) satisfies this condition. The second step of analysis is
to use random number test suites to check the quality
of developed random numbers. To this end, we have
used well known benchmarks such as NIST STS and
Dieharder randomness test suites.
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A. Robustness
As mentioned before, we used all the information
secrecy measures to examine the Robustness of MRE-
IPI. There are three sets to compare: train dataset which
the conversion to stochastic process has been done using
this, test dataset which we did not use them through the
development of MRE-IPI and both of them together as
one dataset.
As shown in Fig. 10 Shannon Entropy of MRE-IPI for
up to string length of 16 is as high as 0.9999. Although,
by increasing the size of the string to 16, the entropy rate
drops from 1 to 0.99993, the difference is negligible. In
total, MRE-IPI shows very high Shannon Entropy, and
thus provides high quality randomness in Perfect Secrecy
assumption.
Fig. 11 shows the Collision Entropy of MRE-IPI. As
shown, the entropy rate even up to string lengths of 16
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for training, testing and complete datasets is higher than
0.99986. Fig. 12 presents the Guessing Entropy analysis
of MRE-IPI. As shown, for string lengths higher than
6, the Guess Entropy (subtracted from 0.5) is less than
0.01 and for string length of 16 for all datasets are less
than 1e−03. Thus, MRE-IPI is able to provide the the
Robustness in Conditional Secrecy scenario.
For Min-Entropy (fig. 13), the values for train, test
and complete datasets are almost equal. All the datasets,
with the string length of 16, have Min-Entropy rate
higher than 0.930. This shows a great increase in Min-
Entropy of IPI after using MRE-IPI algorithm. Min-
Entropy is a measure for Unconditional Secrecy and
MRE-IPI shows Robust randomness in the worse case
scenario (Unconditional Secrecy).
Fig. 14 shows the uniformity check of the distribution
of MRE-IPI databases. This is the Probabilistic Bound
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Fig. 14: Uniformity check for MRE-IPI datasets in
various string lengths
one of the information secrecy measures. For all datasets
in MRE-IPI (train, test and complete), the values are less
than 0.02 for all string lengths and thus, MRE-IPI shows
almost uniform distribution. In total, MRE-IPI shows that
it has the Robustness condition of a strong randomness
source.
B. Permanence
The next step is to check the Permanence condition
of MRE-IPI using the δ value of SV-source to see how
much the MRE-IPI depends to its history. As shown in
Fig. 15, MRE-IPI has a great reduction in dependency
compared to the IPI value itself. Up to string length of
10, δ is less than 0.1, and δ increases for string lengths 16
to a max value of 0.4. This is a significant improvement
compare to IPI value in which δ for string length 16
is almost 1. This result shows that MRE-IPI has much
lower dependency to its history compared to original
IPI. Thus, it can provide Permanence condition to some
extent. In this situation, MRE-IPI is not recommended
to be used as the secret key for a session, however, it
could be used as a one-time-pad to exchange the session
key such as [55].
C. Test Suites Analysis
To evaluate a random extraction algorithm, a number
of statistical tests have been proposed. A combination
of randomness test algorithms is called a randomness
suite or a battery of tests. The most used batteries of
tests in randomness assessment are: NIST STS [38] and
Dieharder [43]. A randomness suite usually needs a large
set of random numbers for its tests. For instance, in NIST
STS Linear test, the length of a sequence of bits must be
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Fig. 15: δ value of SV-source for various string lengths
of MRE-IPI
greater than 106 and at least 100 sequences are needed
to get a reliable result from the test. This is more than
3,000,000 of 32-bit integer numbers. Using the collected
IPI dataset, in this research, we evaluated MRE-IPI com-
pared to the recent IPI randomness extraction algorithms
by 2-dimensional scatter plot and two batteries of tests:
NIST STS, and Dieharder.
1) Two Dimensional Scatter Plot: The first step to
examine the strength of randomness extractor algorithms
is to produce a 2D scatter plots of N points obtained from
them. The N points are generated in the t-dimensional
unit hypercube [0, 1]t , either by taking vectors of t
successive output values from the extractor algorithm, or
by taking t non-successive values at pre-specified lags.
The output of this 2D scatter plot should demonstrate
a plane area without any specific pattern. To implement
this, randomness statistical test suite with name TestU01
[42] is used and the output is presented in Fig. 16. As
shown, all the current randomness extractor algorithms
left a pattern in their figure. However, MRE-IPI produces
an almost uniform distribution of numbers without any
recognisable pattern.
2) NIST STS Test Suite: NIST STS is the first statis-
tical suite for randomness test several of them consisting
multiple sub-tests. In total, there are 190 tests and sub-
tests for NIST STS. In order to test the IPI randomness
extractor algorithms, two series of examinations are
taken place. In the first series, the binary dataset of
random numbers is considered as the sequences with
length 10,000 (10k) bits. In the second series of tests,
1,000,000 (1M) bits create a sequence to be tested in
NIST STS.
The reason is that in NIST STS with longer sequences,
there will be more confident in the results. Moreover,
12
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Fig. 16: Uniformity check from 2D scatter plot (TestU01) comparing our result (h) with algorithms proposed in
selected works (a-g)
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there are some tests which cannot work with short bit
sequences such as Random Excursions Test and Random
Excursions Variant Test. However, if we increase the
length of sequences, the number of available sequences
will be reduced which decreases the confident in the
results as well. In order to have a better picture of
the quality of the results of NIST STS, we used both
short (10k bits) and long (1M bits) sequences in the
experiments.
We showed in Table II the results of NIST STS Test
Suite on the works [27], [30], [56], [35], [33], [36], [23]
compared with MRE-IPI. The algorithms proposed in
[30] and [31] are very similar and thus one column for
their results is used for them. [23], [37] and [22] also
proposed very similar extraction algorithms and thus one
column is presenting the results for them. As shown in
the table, [36], [23] are the closest works to MRE-IPI
by 55% and 57% rate of success in passing tests for
sequence length 10k, while MRE-IPI has passed 80% of
the NIST STS with the same sequence length. Moving
to sequences with length 1M bits, the highest passing
rate of 12% tests belongs to [35], while MRE-IPI has
the pass rate of 86% for NIST STS tests. That clearly
shows the robustness of the extraction method which
with various length of sequences in testing, provides high
quality results.
In addition to success rate in passing the tests, check-
ing the proportion of sequences passing a test is another
measure to examine the quality of a randomness extrac-
tor. The confidence interval (ci) for proportion of the
binary sequences which passed the tests is calculated
from Eq. 16, where pˆ is 1 − α and m is the number of
sequences.
ci = pˆ ± 3
√
3ˆ(1 − pˆ)
m
(16)
The alpha value and the percentage of sequences
which passed that confidence interval for MRE-IPI and
other methods in literature are presented in Table III.
Base on this table, with 95% confidence more than
82% of sequences have passed the test for MRE-IPI,
which is an improvement over the closest result belongs
to [23] with 71.28% pass rate of sequences with 95%
confidence. Figure 17 shows the scatter plot of p-values
for NIST STS tests. Although these figures suggest slight
improvement compared to other methods, we will show
in the next section that our solution is a much stronger
randomness generator in practice.
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TABLE III: Percentage of sequences which passed the
tests based on various α values
Extraction Seq size = 10,000
Methods α = 0.10 α = 0.05 α = 0.01
[27] 35.64 23.93 9.04
[30] 58.51 54.26 45.74
[34] 47.87 27.66 0.00
[35] 51.60 36.70 13.83
[33] 65.43 61.17 48.40
[36] 64.89 64.89 47.87
[23] 71.28 70.21 59.57
MRE-IPI 85.11 85.11 76.60
Extraction Seq size = 1,000,000
Methods α = 0.10 α = 0.05 α = 0.01
[27] 10.64 7.45 1.06
[30] 3.19 2.13 0.00
[34] 10.11 10.11 10.11
[35] 8.51 8.51 8.51
[33] 0.00 0.00 0.00
[36] 0.00 0.00 0.00
[23] 0.53 0.53 0.53
MRE-IPI 90.96 82.98 54.79
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Fig. 17: Scatter plot of the p-values for NIST STS tests
D. Dieharder Test Suite
The final step to examine the quality of MRE-IPI is to
use Dieharder randomness test suite. Dieharder consists
of 31 tests some include several sub-tests. In overall
there are 114 tests and sub-tests. The output of Dieharder
provides three ranks for each test including: PASSED,
WEAK and FAILED. We implemented the recent ran-
domness extraction algorithms from IPI ([27], [30], [34],
[35], [36], [33], [23]), all of them have been FAILED in
all the tests in Dieharder test suite. So, to evaluate the
quality of MRE-IPI, we selected four standard random
number generators. The first one is Microsoft Excel,
the second one is Niederreiter, Borosh random number
generator [57], the third one is Robert R. (Bob) Coveyou
random number generator [58] and finally the last one is
AES random number generator (e.g. [59]). For the last
three random number generators, we used Dieharder ran-
domness test suite for both generation and test. As shown
in Table IV, MRE-IPI completely outperforms Excel and
[57] random number generators. The quality of MRE-
IPI is slightly better than [58], however, it is still far
below AES. The reason for this could be the problem of
Permanence condition in MRE-IPI. Although it is much
better than IPI itself, the independency to history still is
not 100% and perfect. Thus, MRE-IPI failed in the tests
such as OPSO, OQSO, DNA and DAB DCT (Table IV).
This shows that although MRE-IPI has high quality in
Robustness and Uniqueness, it may not be suitable to
be used as a general cryptographic key. Because of not
perfect Permanence condition, our suggestion is to use
additional tools such as hashing to convert MRE-IPI to
a cryptographic key. This is maybe the case and we
will evaluate this in future work. However, we showed
already that the MRE-IPI is sufficiently good to be
used in a cryptosystem. Nevertheless, due to the limited
resources in IMDs, MRE-IPI can be used as a one-
time pad for exchanging session key. For example, the
gateway (outside the body) and IMD negotiated on a time
and start to measure the IPI. Then, using MRE-IPI they
create a one-time pad with the length same as the main
key of the session. The gateway, produces the session
key and encrypts it with a simple operation like XOR
using the one-time pad and sends it to the IMD. Finally,
IMD using its own one-time pad decrypts the received
message and store the session key for encryption and
decryption of the next messages. In this scheme the
usage of MRE-IPI is reduced to a very few messages.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although previous work has advocated the use of
the physiological value in securing Body Sensor Net-
work and access to IMDs, the application proposed
for randomness extraction led to weak security and
were not throughly evaluated. In this paper, using a
sophisticated dataset with almost 900,000,000 IPI val-
ues, we measured the three condition of a strong ran-
dom source: Uniqueness, Robustness and Permanence.
we showed that IPI value satisfies the condition of
Uniqueness when up to four least significant bits of
it are being used as the source of randomness. IPI is
a Robust random source where the scenario in Perfect
Secrecy or Conditional Secrecy. However, it is not able
to provide the Robustness in the worst case scenario
or Unconditional Secrecy. Moreover, we showed that
IPI does not have the condition of Permanence as it
15
TABLE IV: Dieharder Test Suite results for proposed
method and some conventional random number genera-
tors
Test Name Excel [57] [58] AES MRE-IPI
Birthdays 0 1 1 1 1
OPERM5 0 1 1 1 1
32x32 Binary
Rank
0 0 0 1 1
6x8 Binary Rank 0 0 0 1 0
Bitstream 0 0 0 1 0
OPSO 0 0 0 1 0
OQSO 0 0 0 1 0
DNA 0 0 0 1 0
Count the 1s
(stream)
0 0 0 1 0
Count the 1s
(byte)
0 0 0 1 1
Parking Lot 0 1 1 1 1
Minimum
Distance (2d
Circle)
0 1 1 0 1
3d Sphere (Mini-
mum Distance)
0 1 1 1 1
Squeeze 0 1 1 1 0
Sums 0 1 1 1 1
Runs 0 0 1 1 1
Craps 0 0 1 1 1
Marsaglia and
Tsang GCD
0 0 0 1 1
STS Monobit 0 0 1 1 1
STS Runs 0 0 0 1 1
STS Serial (Gen-
eralized)
0 0 0 1 0
RGB Bit Distri-
bution
0 0 0 1 0
RGB
Generalized
Minimum
Distance
0 0 1 1 0
RGB
Permutations
0 1 1 0 1
RGB Lagged
Sum
0 0 0 1 0
RGB
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov
0 0 1 1 0
Byte Distribution 0 0 0 1 0
DAB DCT 0 0 0 1 0
DAB Fill Tree 0 1 0 1 0
DAB Fill Tree 2 0 0 0 1 0
DAB Monobit 2 0 0 0 1 0
Total 0 9 13 29 14
Percentage 0.00 0.29 0.42 0.94 0.45
is highly depended to its history. Thus, we do not
recommend extraction of random number from the IPI
value. However, rather than using the value of IPI, we
proposed using its trend. By converting the IPI trend to
a Martingale Stochastic Process, we developed a random
number extraction method named as MRE-IPI. Despite
IPI, MRE-IPI provides Robustness in all information
secrecy measures, even in Unconditional Secrecy. As
it only uses the first two least significant bits of IPI,
it also satisfies the condition of Uniqueness. MRE-IPI
has much lower dependency to its history compared to
IPI and thus has better Permanence condition. However,
still it is not a completely independent from its history.
The reason is that IPI itself is not a strong randomness
source with highly dependency to the history. MRE-IPI
was able to cure this dependency by looking at the trend
of IPI rather than its value, which is not completely
independent from the value of IPI. Furthermore, using
randomness test suites such as NIST STS and Dieharder,
we showed that MRE-IPI has an almost perfect score in
NIST STS suite and could pass Dieharder with a quality
as half as AES random number generator, while other
IPI randomness extraction algorithms failed to pass the
tests. We conclude that, as MRE-IPI has the properties of
Robustness, Uniqueness and to some level the property
of Permanence, and as it is measurable in every person
(Universality) everywhere and any time (Liveness), it
can be considered as an almost strong random extractor.
However, due to its dependency to history (although not
very high), it was not able to pass several tests of Die
Harder suite. Nevertheless, we advocate the evaluation
steps used in this paper as a general evaluation method
for PVS. The dataset we have used will be available
at [60]. We must mention that MRE-IPI should be
computed in an IMD and it is using a far simpler and
smaller algorithm where an IMD is very limited in every
aspect of computation, yet, MRE-IPI was able to produce
a quality as half as AES. We propose using MRE-IPI as
a one-time pad in IMDs to receive the secure session
key from the reader. This reduces the usage of MRE-IPI
during a secure communication and thus it reduces the
probability of breaking it.
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